Molinism’s Unanswered Question: What Grounds God’s Middle Knowledge?
Luis de Molina (1535-1600), founder of Molinism
Introduction
Molinism is one of the most sophisticated attempts to reconcile divine sovereignty with human free will. Developed by the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, it posits that God possesses middle knowledge—a type of knowledge that allows Him to know what free creatures would do in any given circumstance. This knowledge enables God to actualize a world that aligns with His divine purposes while still allowing for human libertarian free will.
However, a crucial question remains largely unexplored: What is the basis of God’s middle knowledge? Why are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) true in the first place? The standard Molinist response is that these truths exist as brute facts independent of God’s will. Yet, this answer leaves many unresolved philosophical and theological tensions.
I propose a refinement to Molinism: Before God can know a person’s counterfactual choices, He must first design that person. This step—God’s conception of every possible individual’s essence—logically precedes His knowledge of their CCFs and provides a robust foundation for middle knowledge. By incorporating divine design as a prior step, we not only strengthen Molinism’s coherence but also enhance its appeal to theological traditions that emphasize divine sovereignty, such as Calvinism.
Traditional Molinist Model of Divine Knowledge
Molinism traditionally holds that God’s knowledge is structured in three logical moments:
Natural Knowledge – God knows all possible things He could create, including all possible individuals and circumstances. This knowledge is necessary and independent of His will.
Middle Knowledge – God knows what free creatures would do in any possible circumstance. This knowledge is also independent of His will but contingent upon the free decisions of creatures.
Free Knowledge – God knows what will happen in the actual world He chooses to create. This knowledge is dependent on His decree to actualize a particular world.
Middle knowledge, then, is crucial because it allows God to sovereignly orchestrate history without violating human freedom. Yet, it assumes that counterfactual truths about human choices exist independently of God’s creative decree. This assumption raises several questions:
What makes counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true?
If these truths exist independently of God, does that limit His sovereignty?
Why are some counterfactuals true and others false?
The lack of a clear answer to these questions leaves Molinism open to objections from both deterministic and skeptical perspectives.
A Proposed Refinement: Divine Design Before Middle Knowledge
To address these concerns, I propose an additional step in God’s logical order of knowledge: Before God can know a person’s counterfactuals, He must first conceive of that person’s nature, including their inclinations, personality, and reasoning abilities. This means:
Every possible individual has a divinely conceived essence that includes natural predispositions.
These predispositions influence, but do not determine, their choices.
Middle knowledge then arises as a function of how these designed individuals would freely respond in various situations.
This modification does not eliminate libertarian free will. Instead, it acknowledges that every person is created with particular inclinations that make certain choices more probable while still preserving the genuine possibility of alternative decisions.
“Before God can know a person’s counterfactual choices, He must first design that person.”
For example, consider an individual designed with a natural predisposition toward anger. In a situation that provokes anger, he may be 80% likely to lose his temper and 20% likely to stay calm. However, because the probability of staying calm is never zero, he retains the ability to choose either path. The actualization of his choice remains free, but his design helps explain the likelihood of his responses in various circumstances.
Implications for Free Will and Divine Sovereignty
This refinement strengthens Molinism in several key ways:
1. It Provides a Grounding for CCFs
By placing divine design before middle knowledge, we offer an intelligible grounding for why counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true. They are not brute facts existing independently of God, but rather truths that arise from the way God has sovereignly conceived of each individual’s nature.
2. It Preserves Libertarian Free Will
A common concern is that if God designs individuals with particular inclinations, then their choices might be determined rather than free. However, this is a misunderstanding of how inclinations function within libertarian free will. As long as no choice is necessitated—meaning that alternatives remain genuinely possible—free will is preserved. Divine design influences probabilities but does not eliminate genuine alternatives.
3. It Strengthens Divine Sovereignty
One of the main objections Calvinists raise against Molinism is that it seems to make God’s decree dependent on human choices, rather than the other way around. However, under this refined model, God first designs individuals according to His sovereign will before He considers their counterfactual choices. This preserves God’s ultimate control over the created order while still allowing for meaningful creaturely freedom.
4. It Makes Molinism More Theologically Robust
By incorporating divine design, this model bridges the gap between Molinist and Reformed perspectives. Calvinists can appreciate that God’s sovereign creative act determines the nature of individuals (Ps. 139:13-16; Rom. 12:3), while Molinists can still affirm that these individuals make genuinely free choices.
Addressing Possible Objections
Critics may argue that this model collapses into determinism, but this concern misunderstands the distinction between influence and necessity. Designing a person with particular inclinations does not remove their ability to act contrary to those inclinations. Furthermore, this model aligns with common theological intuitions. For example, Scripture acknowledges that individuals are created with particular dispositions (Ex. 4:11, Jer. 1:5; Rom. 9:20-21), yet they remain responsible for their choices (Deut. 30:19, Josh. 24:15).
“As long as no choice is necessitated… free will is preserved. Divine design influences probabilities but does not eliminate genuine alternatives.”
Additionally, this model does not introduce anything radically new; it simply makes explicit what is already implicit in Molinism and in Scripture. Every possible world in Molinism already presupposes the existence of certain individuals with particular natures. The only difference here is recognizing that divine design logically precedes middle knowledge rather than assuming CCFs exist independently.
Conclusion
By introducing divine design as a logically prior step to middle knowledge, this refinement makes Molinism more coherent and theologically satisfying. It upholds both divine sovereignty and libertarian free will while providing a compelling answer to the grounding problem of counterfactuals.
This model also creates a more attractive middle ground between Molinism and Calvinism, preserving both God's sovereign role in election and human responsibility. Future discussions on Molinism should consider this missing step as a way to strengthen its philosophical and theological foundations.
If Molinism is to remain a compelling model of divine foreknowledge and providence, it must answer the question of why counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true. By proposing that God first designs every possible individual before knowing their counterfactual choices, we provide a robust answer that satisfies both philosophical rigor and theological depth.
This refinement invites further discussion and exploration, not only within Molinist circles but also among those who have traditionally been skeptical of Molinism’s assumptions. Through this synthesis, we may perhaps find a more complete and satisfying view of God’s knowledge and providence.
